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Department of Legislation
Charles B. Nutting, Editor-in-Charge

n Interest in the codification of the criminal law is currently at a high point because
of the American Law Institute's proposal to prepare a model criminal code and because of the Wisconsin project previously described in these pages. In the following
article Professor Hall, an eminent authority in the field, comments on the significance of
codification and on some of the problems involved.

Codification of the Criminal Law
By Jerome Hall
Professor of Law, Indiana University
m Codification of the criminal law
involves problems, methods and values which are important not only
for the current practice of law in
many of its branches; they also raise
challenging questions about the future practice of law and the functions of the Bar.
The illustrious precedent established by Edward Livingston should
help persuade leaders of the Bar that
they have an obligation to contribute
their skills to penal codification.
Moreover, the recent enormous expansion of the criminal law in corporate and commercial areas involves
the interest of many clients, which
can not be safeguarded by occasional
dips into criminal law. A sustained
thoughtful effort to codify the criminal law is an excellent way to become
familiar with that important branch
of the corpus juris.
The time is opportune for a revival
of the traditional interest of the
American Bar in the criminal law because of the current codification
movement. In 1947 Louisiana
adopted a criminal code; and there
are similar projects under way in
Wisconsin and other states. And the
American Law Institute has recently
initiated a national program to provide a model criminal code.'
The criminal law is largely expressed in statutes which in most
states at the present time comprise
a veritable hodgepodge. There is a
pressing need to organize these materials so that obsolete rules can be
eliminated, inconsistencies resolved,
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and the retained laws readily located.
These obviously needed immediate
objectives can in good measure be
attained by a careful examination
and ordering of the existing statutes.
Codification, looking far beyond
that important objective, seeks to
systematize the entire criminal law.
For example, modern penal codes
are divided into a General Part and
a Special Part, the former including
principles and doctrines applicable
to all crimes, while the latter includes
only the distinctive material elements
of the various specific crimes. Thus,
in a sound criminal code, the various
parts are logically interrelated, and
the consequences for adjudication
and practice are analogous to the
achievements of a science as contrasted with a mere aggregate of unrelated bits of knowledge on various
subjects.
The codification of the criminal
law includes objectives that extend
far beyond even the systematization
of all existing statutes and decisions.
What is called for, in sum, is the
most searching study of the entire
criminal law that is possible, the discovery of necessary reforms, and a
clear precise code which reflects the
best relevant knowledge of the problems of criminal law. The potentialities of such an inquiry for legal
progress are so great that any present
estimate must be a severe understatement.
During the past half century there
has been an enormous growth in
scientific and social knowledge which

is relevant to the problems of criminal law. These disciplines also comprise a variegated, often tricky, terrain where some are tempted to accept all of the claims put forth in
the name of science, while others,
sensing a threat to important values,
reject the new learning in toto. What
is needed, however, is thoughtful
criticism and judicious use of whatever knowledge withstands such analysis.
For example, this century has witnessed the rise of psychiatry to a
position of great importance for the
criminal law. When one explores the
literature of psychiatry he discovers
that some previously neglected facts
are well established, e.g., the large
role of unconscious drives and emotions. But he also finds much dogmatism, conflicting theories and
naive criticism of the bases of legal
liability. The obvious desideratum
is to cull the sound from the fallacious and to utilize the former in
improvement of the law. This is not
as simply done as said; and the present major obstacle is the lack of participation in relevant inquiries by
competent members of the Bar.
The hazard we face is that the theories and opinions of nonlegal specialists will prevail, unchallenged by
the scrutiny of competent lawyers
who have studied the relevant sciences and disciplines. Unfortunately
the "average practitioner" is apt to
react in one of two ways: either he
will say, "How can I pit my judgment
about psychiatry against that of a
recognized authority?" Or he will
say, "All of that 'stuff' is dogmatic,
fallacious, and dangerous. Away with
it!" But if there is a large core of
valid knowledge in psychiatry, which
has very important bearings on vital
legal and social issues, neither of
these reactions is defensible. Since the
problems to be dealt with are ultimately legal ones, some competent
lawyers-and the more the bettermust appraise the relevant claims of
scientific and other knowledge, and
1. An excellent statement of the American
Law Institute's project has been supplied by the
Reporter, Professor Herbert Wechsler, in "The
Challenge of a Model Penal Code", 65 Horv. L.
Rev. 1097 (1952).
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contribute the kind of analysis that
must be available if our law is to
progress.
To cite another specific instance of
present needs and opportunities, it
is only in the past quarter of a century that scientific knowledge of alcoholism has been supplied. This also
has important implications for criminal law because although intoxication is a factor in many crimes, few
courts have been informed of the
available facts and knowledge. Solution of all the relevant legal problems again depends upon lawyers'
familiarity with the literature on alcoholism to the point of being able
to participate intelligently in conferences with experts in that field.
With reference to juvenile delinquency, sex crimes, theft and many
other types of harmful behavior, considerable knowledge has also become
available, which a broadly conceived
program of codification should utilize.
As was indicated above, such a
project, while it provides unparalleled opportunities to reappraise and
improve a very important branch of
the law, is also hazardous. Consider,
for example, the claims of superior
knowledge put forth by social scientists and psychiatrists who criticize
the criminal law as archaic and completely untouched by recent science.
Again, some psychiatrists hold that
crime is a disease, that all criminals
are sick. Obviously such a theory has
drastic implications for moral and
legal standards of criminal liability.
The validity of the thesis propounded by the experts must be
carefully evaluated by lawyers since
there is no short cut to uniformly
held "better answers". The above
theory of crime may represent the
position of relatively few, but tremendously articulate, psychiatrists.
Subjected to the hard tests of experience, common sense and opposing
scientific positions, it may be totally
unsound. On the other hand, it may
have important relevance for some
offenders. In any case, ill-phrased as
the theory often is, it challenges the
legal profession to establish a sound
relationship between law and science.

A second major hazard in codification concerns the principle of legality, the "rule of law" in the field of
crimes. Statutes and case-law now
provide specific definitions, proscriptions and, consequently, limitations
on official power. The threat to this
dearly won tradition comes from two
directions. Draftsmen, intent on logical and aesthetic results, may also be
unmindful of the relevant political
values, and they may draft many provisions in general terms. They may
even wish to confer upon the courts
great powers of discretion in interpreting the criminal code. Such innovations would undermine the principle of legality in the field of crimes.
The remedy is insistence on retention
of the common law of crimes, especially in interpretation of general,
vague or ambiguous phrases, realistic
precision in drafting the code, and
uncompromising adherence to the
values that protect individuals from
the iron hand of the state when it is
applying the heavy sanctions of penal
law. This danger to basic legal safeguards is abetted by social scientists
who imagine that their discipline has
achieved the status of an exact science. In effect, they demand that
their opinions be substituted for legal
controls. The short answer to such
demands is that the nonlegal experts
should be kept on tap, but not on
top. A fuller, better answer is a
careful critique of the relevant disciplines and values of a democratic
legal order.
The deliberate recognition of possible dangers involved in codification
of the criminal law is a necessary
condition of legal progress. However,
it provides no defense of the uninformed or of ostrich-like indifference.
Nor can potential dangers to existing
institutions be avoided by indiscriminate opposition to all proposed reforms. Change is inevitable, and the
preservation of sound values, as well
as the implementation of important
new ones, requires considerable effort. There is no escape, therefore,
at least for thoughtful persons, from
active, sincere, searching inquiry.
Consequently, the over-all question concerning codification of the

criminal law is this-how can one
best participate in such an enterprise
or, more directly, what methods
should be used to provide the best
possible code? The available methods
include both traditional, professional
methods and scientific methods. In
the past, codification has been the
product of traditional, professional
methods, i.e., of preponderant concern with statutes, codes, case-law
and treatises. Since law does not
exist in a vacuum, critical appraisal
of the legal materials was, of course,
enlightened by common sense, experience and such smatterings of scientific knowledge as became fortuitously available. Scientific methods of
codification do not exclude or depreciate the use of the legal materials
or the professional techniques of
applying them. They supplement
them by (1) concentration on relevant facts; (2) thorough use of scientific and other relevant knowledge;
(3) articulation of methods employed
and steps taken so that (a) the best
methods are used and (b) the various
steps in the investigation can be retraced and checked; (4) the entire
procedure is carried on systematically, and (5) a final record of relevant empirical science and ethical
knowledge is provided.
It is possible to argue that allegedly scientific methods add nothing
but pretension to the traditional
professional ones. It is possible to
argue that the difference is not novel
but only represents an emphasis. It
is possible to argue that the difference
is monumental and that the implications for the functions of the legal
profession in the future are revolutionary in the best sense. These issues
cannot be discussed here. 2 What is
possible in this brief comment is to
urge unbiased reflection on the importance of factual investigation in
relation to legal problems and appreciation of the persistent use of available knowledge and the best methods
of research.
Without elaboration of the divisions of the indicated factual-legal
2. See generally, Jerome Hall, Theft, Law and
Society (2d ed. 1952).
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researches which, in the writer's judgment, are necessary to the production
of the best possible code, the following outline may be suggestive:
1. Intensive factual research into
certain social problems regarding
which legal controls are or should be
employed, together with a critique
of the relevant values.
2. A thorough study of the relevant existing law. This includes not
only its restatement, together with
commentaries, but also its history
and, especially, researches into its
functioning.3
3. Many legal problems would be
formulated in the light of the two
preceding stages of the work. Especially important would be the dis-

covery and formulation of problems code in future years, as scientific and
which can in good measure be solved moral knowledge progressed.
if available factual knowledge is
That scientific and other sound
soundly employed.
methods of research can be used very
4. The relevant disciplines and profitably in analysis and solution of
sciences would be searched (and con- legal problems is no longer a pious
ferences of specialists and lawyers hope or exhortation. Several extant
arranged) to provide the necessary large-scale studies and numerous
information and knowledge, in the shorter ones supply specific concrete
light of which the provisions of the illustrations and supports of the
code would be drafted.
above assertion. Their implications
5. A record should be provided for other fields of law than the crimiwhich, in effect, would be the empir- nal law and, consequently, for the
ical scientific foundation and the functions of the Bar are very signifirationale of the values upon which cant.
the code was constructed. The least
advantage of such a record would be
3. As to the significance of the functioning of
to facilitate pointed informed dis- rules for both the understanding of present law
and the discovery of needed reforms, see Hall,
cussion as well as improvement of the Theft, Low and Society (2d ed. 1952).

Notice by the Board of Elections
z The following jurisdictions will
elect a State Delegate for a three-year
term beginning at the adjournment
of the 1953 Annual Meeting and
ending at the adjournment of the
1956 Annual Meeting:

Alabama
Missouri
Alaska
New Mexico
California
North Carolina
Florida
North Dakota
Hawaii
Pennsylvania
Kansas
Tennessee
Kentucky
Vermont
Massachusetts
Virginia
Wisconsin
Nominating petitions for all State
Delegates to be elected in 1953
must be filed with the Board of
Elections not later than March 27,
1953. Petitions received too late for
publication in the March issue of
the JOURNAL (deadline for March
issue, January 28; deadline for April
issue, February 27; deadline for May
issue, March 31) cannot be pub-
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lished prior to distribution of ballots, fixed by the Board of Elections
for April 3, 1953. Ballots must be
returned by June 8, 1953.
Forms of nominating petitions
may be obtained from the Headquarters of the American Bar Association, 1140 North Dearborn Street,
Chicago 10, Illinois. Nominating petitions must be received at the Headquarters of the Association before
the close of business at 5:00 P.M.,
March 27, 1953.
Attention is called to Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides:
Not less than one hundred and
fifty days before the opening of the
annual meeting in each year, twentyfive or more members of the Association in good standing and accredited to a State from which a State
Delegate is to be elected in that year,
may file with the Board of Elections,
constituted as hereinafter provided, a
signed petition (which may be in
parts), nominating a candidate for

the office of State Delegate for and
from such state.
Only signatures of members in
good standing will be counted. A
member who is in default in the payment of dues for six months is not
a member in good standing. Each
nominating petition must be accompanied by a typewritten list of
the names and addresses of the signers in the order in which they appear on the petition.
Special notice is hereby given that
no more than twenty-five names of
signers to any petition will be published.
Ballots will be mailed to the members in good standing accredited to
the states in which elections are to
be held within thirty days after the
time for filing nominating petitions
expires.
BOARD OF ELECTIONS
Edward T. Fairchild, Chairman
William P. MacCracken, Jr.
Harold L. Reeve.

